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NOTES
MEANING OF "AGGRESSION"
IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
(Results of a Short Seminar in International Law, Spring 1954,
College of Law, University of Nebraska, under the supervision
of Professor Willard B. Cowles.)'
At its Seventh Session (1952) the General Assembly of the United
Nations adopted a resolution establishing a fifteen member Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression.2 The resolution
assumed that a definition of the term "aggression" would be adopted
by the General Assembly at its Ninth Session (Autumn, 1954). During
the 1953 Summer Sessions of this Committee, twelve of the fifteen
States favored the adoption of a definition. The United States was one
of three States which opposed formulating any definition.3 There is
much to be said against the adoption of any definition of the term "ag-
gression" at this time.4 It is the view of the seminar that the best ap-
proach to the matter would be to prick out the meaning of "aggression'"
from case to case. The proposed definition which follows is set forth,
not because this group believes the time is ripe for a definition, but
for what it may be worth in case some definition of the term is in fact
to be adopted shortly by the General Assembly.
The seminar makes no attempt here to define "aggression" gener-
ally, but only "aggression" within our understanding of the meaning
of that term as used in the United Nations Charter.5
1 The regular members of this seminar were: John Hopewell Faltys; Ron-
ald W. Hunter; John D. Knapp; Norman G. Oliver, Jr.; David D. Tews; How-
ard E. Tracy; and Gladwyn A. Youngs. Harry F. Cunningham participated in
the seminar as an auditor.
The seminar wishes to recognize expressly the valuable assistance of Henry
M. Gallagher, Jr.
2 Resolution 688 (VII) of 20 December 1952; also U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.11,
pp. 4-5.
1 The other two States which opposed formulating any definition were
China and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Report
of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. U.N. Doc.
A/AC.66/L.11, p. 8 (14 October 1953).
' It is well known that the difficulty involved in any effort to define aggres-
sion is as great, or greater, than that involved in defining the basis of tort
liability or of the phrase "due process of law" in American constitutional law.
Although it has been found in tort law that by virtue of many decided cases,
sound narrow generalizations can be established (such as the last clear chance
rule), the idea of the "reasonably prudent man" has not given needed precision.
I The terms "aggression," "act (or acts) of aggression," and "aggressive
policy" appear as follows in the Charter: Article 1: "The Purposes of the
United Nations are: (1) To maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace * * *." Article 39: "The Security Council shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression * * *." Article 53(1): " * * no enforcement action shall be taken
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Basic Considerations
The Charter's two main purposes are stated to be to maintain
international peace and security. Implicit in this provision is a basic
international policy to deter acts which are repugnant to these pur-
poses. In the seminar's view the term "security" as used in this phrase
represents the end result which the maintenance of peace is designed
to achieve. Thus "security" is the ultimate end, and the maintenance
of peace the most important means to achieve that end.7
Proposed Definition
An act of State A which is intended to and which in fact does contrib-
ute to or result in a substantial encroachment upon the independence of
State B or the security of the people of State B in their right to be free
from political repression is an act of aggression within the meaning of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Commentary on the Definition
A. State
By the term "State" we mean a political entity which has capacity
for rights and duties under international law. The United Nations is
charged with the maintenance of international peace and security re-
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy
state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article
107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy
on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on
request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by such a state." (Emphasis in this paragraph
added.)
'Article 1(1). For text see supra, n. 5.
Goodrich and Hambro, in their commentary on the Charter, observe that
formal peace alone "is not enough. Armed peace with the fear of war as the
recurrent theme is not sufficient for the achievement of the purposes of the
United Nations. Peace must be accompanied by a feeling of security, security
from war in particular." (Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Na-
tions, Commentary and Documents (2nd and revised edition, 1949), p. 93. TtM
1946 edition is to the same effect, p. 59. In saying this Goodrich and Hambro
refer to Point 6 of the Atlantic Charter. (Ibid.) The Atlantic Charter set out
"certain common principles in the national policies of their respective coun-
tries," and this "common program of purposes and principles" was subscribed
or adhered to by forty-seven States in the "Declaration by United Nations" of
January 1, 1942. Point 6, among other things, expressed a joint policy "to see
established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in
safety within their own boundaries." (The Atlantic Charter and Declaration by
United Nations, taken from Department of State Publication No. 2298 (Govt.
Printing Off., 1945) pp. 1, 2. Emphasis added.) Again, in 1947 Secretary of
State Marshall said, before the General Assembly, that: "The attitude of the
United States towards the whole range of problems before the United Nations
is founded on a very genuine desire to perfect the Organization so as to safe-
guard the security of States and the well-being of their peoples." (Official
Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, I, p. 26. U.N. Doc.
A/PV.80-109 (1947).) Cf. the ends stated in the Preamble of the Charter,
and the use of the phrase "conditions of stability" in Article 55. See n. 14, infra.
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gardless of whether or not a State involved is a Member of the United
Nations.8 It seems clear that the basic purposes of the Charter are
not to be thwarted by technicalities concerning "what is a State," or
"recognition." The seminar believes that the term "State" in the Char-
ter is to be broadly construed.
B. Intended
The term "intended" is included in the definition to emphasize that
the character of the act is not that of a mere tort, but that of a high
crime. When such an act takes place it must have been preceded by
a choice made by a responsible authority, or authorities, of State A,
and the choice must have been made with the consciousness that the
act will probably bring about results coming within the definition.
C. Contribute To
In particular situations more than one State may be an aggressor.
The sense in which the word "contribute" is used is that of giving a
substantial quantity of aid by another State whether or not such aid
is given pursuant to a formal, informal, or any other type of particu-
lar international agreement between them.9 To illustrate: Donating a
single pair of shoes would not be a "contribution" in the sense in which
the term "contribute" is used, but furnishing a tank or a bomber,
where such a donation is intended to aid in a "substantial encroach-
ment," would come within our meaning of "contribute."'10 It may be
noted in this connection, that Article 2(5) of the Charter, which pro-
vides that all Members shall refrain from giving "assistance" to any
State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or en-
forcement action, is not prefaced by the word "substantial." Where the
quantity of aid is comparatively small, it is our view that considera-
tion should also be given to the relation of that amount to the overall
ability of the contributing State to have made a larger contribution.
Substantial aid, by another State, can only be aggression where a
''substantial encroachment" is also present.
'Article 2(6): "The Organization shall ensure that states which are not
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these -Principles so far
as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security."
' The predominant obligation arising from international agreements of Mem-
bers of the United Nations are those contained in the Charter. Article 103 pro-
vides that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail."
1o Since we are not here concerned with aid designed to prevent aggression,
as regards donations to prevent aggression we observe only by way of contrast
that Chief Justice Marshall's classic statement in 1819 about the American
Constitution seems equally applicable to the Charter of the United Nations (the
words inserted in brackets are to emphasize our point): "Let the end be
legitimate, let it. be within the scope of the constitution [Charter], and all
means which are apropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
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D. Results In
The United Nations is primarily concerned with action-with acts
which produce results contrary to the purposes and principles of the
Charter. "Results" are less difficult to prove than the causes thereof.
The definition is, therefore, put in terms of "results."
E. Substantial Encroachment
Although certain acts of State which result in encroachments upon
the independence of other States may constitute violations of interna-
tional law, not all encroachments on the independence of a State
amount to aggression in the sense of the Charter. To constitute an act
of aggression the Charter requires that the act be of a sinister and
grave character (i.e., "substantial")-all act having a very different
quality from one 'violative of international law in the nature of a
tort or a breach of contract which ordinarily entails only monetary
reparation. 1
F. Independence
The term "independence" is used in its established public law
sense.1
2
G. Right to be Free from Political Repression
A basic principle of the Charter is to develop respect for the "self-
determination of peoples. 13 Article 55 recognizes that the matter of
"self-determination of peoples" includes all peoples, no matter what
their political status.14 The people of an established, independent
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution [Char-
ter], are constitutional [legal]." (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421
[1819].)
"Professor Cowles would use the phrase "gross encroachment" instead of
"substantial encroachment."
" The reader unfamiliar with this basic public law concept is referred to
the introductory chapters of the standard works on International Law, such as
Charles Cheney Hyde's, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied
by the United States (2d. rev. ed., 1945) and Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, Inter-
national Law (7th ed. 1948). Paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article 2 of the Charter
may also be helpful: "1. The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members. * * * 7. Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter
•* *." (Emphasis added.)
"Thus Article 1 (2) states that one of the purposes of the United Nations
is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of * * * self-determination of peoples * * *."
"Article 55 provides that "with a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-de-
termination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (a.) higher stand-
ards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress
and development; '(b.) solutions of international economic, social, health, and
related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c.) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion:'
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State have a right to "self-determination" equal to, if not greater
than, that of colonial peoples. We have used the term "repression"
instead of "self-determination" because the term "self-determination"
has acquired a connotation restricting it to freedom from colonialism.
Respect for the "self-determination" of all peoples seems clearly to
be a part of the "security" which the United Nations is charged to
guarantee. The term "repression" as used in the phrase "security of
the people of State B in their right to be free from political repres-
sion" implies a threat or use of force.
Points Considered But Not Included
The more significant words and phrases considered by the seminar,
but omitted from the definition, and the reasons for their omission
follow:
1. War-like Action
"War-like action" was considered instead of "act" at the beginning
of the definition, but was rejected because the group considered that
any act having the results specified in the definition and done with the
required intent is "aggression," and that "aggression" within the
meaning of the Charter need not be limited to any predetermined
form. Other phrases rejected on this same basis were: "Armed force,"
"threat of force" "economic coercion" "direct or indirect action," "in
pursuit of an unlawful objective," and "conspiracy'
2. Initiated, Inspired
Though an act may appear to be that of State A, State B may have
in fact determined the policy under which the act of State A was per-
formed. It was urged by some members of the seminar that the words
"initiated" or "inspired" be included in the definition to show that
State B was an aggressor. After discussion, however, it was decided
that mere "initiation" or "inspiration" is not enough. Relationships
short of agency, assistance, or control are not, in the seminar's view,
sufficient to bring an act within the Charter's meaning of "aggression."
3. Aids
The seminar considered using the term "aids" but felt that this
concept was covered better by the phrase "contribute to." The words
"sponsors" and "supports," were also considered in connection with
this point, but were rejected for the same reason..
4. Pursuant to a National Policy.
It was suggested that no act of State could be "intended" unless
it was made pursuant to a national policy. However, the seminar felt
that "intent" could be proved in other ways than by the establish-
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ment of the existence of a national policy, and that to require a show-
ing of a national policy in each case would involve a restriction beyond
what the Charter demands.
5. Threat to the Peace. Breach of the Peace
The phrases "threat to the peace" and "breach of the peace" appear
in some parts of the Charter (e.g., Articles 1(1) and 39) in association
with the term "aggression." In at least one instance "aggression" ap-
pears without any reference to "threat to the peace" or "breach of the
peace" (Article 53). Again, Article 51 refers to "armed attack," and
Article 2(4) to the "threat or use of force." It was, at first, suggested
that the phrases "threat to the peace" and "breach of the peace" be
included as requisites for aggression. The seminar believes, however,
that these are illustrative, rather than exhaustive, ways in which an
aggression may take place.
6. Sovereign Equality, Territorial Integrity
The term "sovereign equality" (Article 2(1)) was not included be-
cause of the use of the broader term "independence." The seminar also
decided nbt to use the phrase "territorial integrity," which appears
in Article 2(4), on the ground that the territorial integrity of a State
is a corollary of its "independence," and was therefore covered by
the term "independence."
7. Self-Defense
The term "self-defense" was suggested for inclusion in the defini-
tion but was not adopted. We are attempting to define a high crime.
Legitimate self-defense is not in any sense a crime. While an aggres-
sion, or in some cases, potential aggression, may ordinarily bring into
play the right of self-defense, and while aggression and the right to
self-defense therefore ordinarily have a cause and effect relationship,
we are concerned only with defining aggression, not with other rights
which may arise in connection therewith. (Cf. 35 Am. Jour. of Int.
Law, especially at pp. 357-358 [1941].)
Dissenting Opinion of Harry F. Cunningham
I do not accept the definition of aggression developed by the ma-
jority of the Law College Seminar in International Law, for the fol-
lowing reasons:-
1. The definition adopted by the majority is too verbose and its
very verbosity weakens it.
2. I dislike the references to "State A" and "State B" and would
prefer the terms "any State" and "any other State," which are far more
inclusive and far more usual. For example, the aggression in Korea was
participated in by three States-North Korean People's Republic,
China, Russia. How could these three participants be included under
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the designation "State A"? Each of them would fall, naturally, within
the intent of "any State."
3. There is no provision made for approval, rejection, or otherwise
by the United Nations, which is the "Court of last resort" in deter-
mining that an act of aggression is such. There is no reference to efforts
to arbitrate.
I submit an alternate definition as follows:
Any act of any State, without prior recourse to arbitration, which act
results in a substantial encroachment upon the sovereign rights of an-
other State or the political privileges of its people, is an act of aggres-
sion within the meaning and intent of the Charter of the United Nations,
unless ruled otherwise by the required majority of an appropriate organ
of the United Nations Organisation.
Comment:-The use of the term "any act" permits the inclusion of
contributory as well as direct acts. The use of the term "any State"
includes all participants in an aggressive act, which the use of the
term "State A" cannot do.
Failure to have recourse to arbitration is in accord with the pro-
visions and intent of the Charter of the United Nations as having an
influence upon aggression.
The right of the appropriate organ (Security Council or, in case of
its failure to act due to exercise of the veto, the General Assembly)
to approve or otherwise, an alleged act of aggression as such, is es-
sential, especially to satisfy the demands of the "smaller nations."
HARRY F. CUNNINGHAM
